This discussion is predicated upon the conclusion that Congress should take some affirmative action to satisfy war losses, given the insufficiency of reparation. The basis for that conclusion and the question of the extent of the satisfaction to be afforded involve a variety of considerations. The preponderance of these factors are matters of record; however, the recommendations and suggestions offered are based on my personal appraisal of the obligations of our Government in the matter and the most effective manner of providing relief.
I
DFxINnMON OF THE, TERM "WAR LossEs".
-In its broadest sense the term war losses 'may include all costs of war. However, f6r the purpose of this discussion no such meaning is intended. The extent of th6 Congressional responsibility for providing indemnification, referred to herein, i predicated upon a more selectiVe interpretation. This interpretation is dependefit upon the -existence of -a recognized legal or equitable basis for the claim, a' close proximity of its 'cause to the war, existence of an obligation on the part of the' gdvernment to furnish protection to the claimant, and the non-existence of a satisfactor' m~asure or means of relief. --, The language expressing the distinction in international law between "war losses" and "war claims" varies from source to source, but the controlling idea is that actions, when performed in the ordinary conduct of hostilities, occasion no duty to pay damage for injuries resulting therefrom, whereas acts not normally incident to hostilities do give rise to such a duty. 3 There is no intention to impute any obligation with respect to those war claims which have already been recognized and settled through the numerous domestic and international measures adopted during and after World War II. 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR WAR Loss -

EQUITABLE AND LEGAL BASES FOR WAR CLAIMS GENERALLY
The principal bases for claims arising out of World War H are to be found (a) in international agreements, treaties, conventions, and exchanges of notes; (b) in existing domestic law of the United States;" and (c) in implicit principles, sometimes called the international common law, which govern the behavior of civilizednationt.
The existing body of international law -s reasonably clear on such matters as the violence permissible to belligerents, the .conduct of seizure, the limitation of devastation, retaliation, and ruses, the treatment of enemy aliens and alien property, and the treatmeq, of. te wounded.and pfjsonqrs of war.' It is the behavior falling outside of ,thee and: similar well-defined limitations, however, which creates difficulties in the classification and evaluatiqn. of war claims. ... 
W4, AD-CLAIMS
It ,is well, established that enemy governments, owed certain. obligations.to the person and property of.members of. the United. States Armed Forces, and the United States civilians within their territories,.
Thus, the claims of the United States nationals against enemy governments arr individual claims based on the specific natuge and. degree of maltreatment receivgd, and,. therefore, are the property rights of such individuals. There can be little doubt, in the face of overwhelming evidence, of the wholesale violation of tle written and implied rules of warfare. The brutality and malicious deprivation of human necessities, and life itself, practiced by enemy governments, have been estqllished beyond any doubt, not only by the testimony of the thousands who suffered at their hands, but also by the wealth of written evidence which has been uncovered since the termination of hostilities.....
The results of these violations are likewise well, established. The fact of malnutrition and undernourishment in virtually all of the camps where American military or civilian personnel were detained in World War II has been established. The degree of malnutrition varied, of course, with each, camp and with the length of time each individual was detained. The wanton destruction, confiscation, and misappropriation of the property of the United States nationals has also given rise to innumerable-property claims.
For present purposes the meaning of war losses is restricted to the following types of claims:
x. Claims based on death, personal injury, detention, etc. Loss of life, not the result of natural causes or combat activities. 
PRSENT SOURCES OF RELIEF AvAILABIL
The extent to which claims arising out of World War II have been or may be satisfied is extremely difficult to determine with precision because of the scope' of existing international agreements and foreign and domestic laws, the piecemeal ianner of their negotiation or enactment, and the variety of definitions of the term "war claims" which have been adopted.
With respect to domestic legislation, the machinery which existed prior to the war for accepting and settling claims against the Government was utilized during the war and, in certain instances, is still functioning. In addition, numerous temporary and emergency measures were adopted during and after the war which also deal in part with the recognition, receipt, and adjudication of war claims. To this extent Congress has already distributed the burden of war losses by direct appropriation.
. A search of the Statutes at Large since the Seventy-Fifth Congress indicates that approximately fifty Public Laws have been enacted which in some manner recognize and provide for the satisfaction of war losses. This legislation can be categorized generally as War Insurance Legislation, Military and Naval Claims Legislation, Rehabilitation, Indemnification, and Relief Legislation, and War Contracts Legislation. These categories do not include, of course, the various acts passed in the last tert years for the benefit of veterans. It is questionable, however, whether the majority of tuch enactments can be contidered" as claims legislation in as much as they are, In a large measure, designed to grant gratuitous benefits rather than to compeiisate legally enforceable claims.
In considering the role of the courts in this matter, it is apparent that a volume of war claims of one type or another has been. and will be the subject of private and governmental litigation. In" addition to te functions of the numerous state and federal courts, and of the Tax Court with respect to contract cases, the Court of Claims would appear to play a prominent part.
In determining the measure of satisfaction of war losses provided by international agreements and foreign legislation, one of the basic matters for consideration is a discussion of the pertinent provisions of the treaties of peace already in force. This consideration will be reserved, however, until the subject of reparation is discussed. It should be borne in mind, however, with reference to the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, thai the practice of those governments in settling war claims is not in conformity with the obligations created by the treaties.
In addition, numerous other avenues of relief, through lend-lease and war account settlement agreements and agreements on a military level, are available for intergovernmental claims, and to some extent for claims resulting from torts committed by the forces of the parties to the agreements.
Basic to any consideration of the status of war claims is the principle, well established in international law, that a claimant before seeking the interposition of his own government in his efforts to obtain satisfaction for his claim must first exhaust whatever local remedies are available in the country against whose government his claim lies.
Exceptions to this principle have been recognized, where justice is wanting; where local remedies have been superseded; where the remedy is insufficient; where unjust judgments have been rendered; or where unjust discrimination is practiced against such nationals
In the majority of instances the availability of satisfactory settlement through foreign legislation or local remedies is definitely limited. There are governments, however-for example, The Netherlands-which have developed a fairly comprehensive system for satisfying war claims relating to property loss or damage. In these instances an avenue of relief is available and must be pursued before relief can be sought through our government's intervention.
V
PRCEDENTS FOR UNITED STATES WAR CLAIMS POLICY
The development of American principles of protection applied to national and foreign claimants has been reflected in our past international arbitrations. This development has been of wide influence and consonant with the legal philosophy of this nation to do what is right and just. Reference to the authorities 7 will reveal in detail the history, jurisdiction, and decisions of such tribunals to which the United States was a party.
Settlement of war claims and the affording of relief to nationals of the United States suffering as a result of war have generally been effected by the creation of international tribunals. Despite the fact that the handling of claims arising out of earlier wars, in terms of number and value, was relatively simple, their settlement Has nevertheless usually been accompanied by prolonged and discouraging delays.
In the interest of sound international relations and for the immediate equitable compensation of the claims of our nationals, it seems that the method of settlement is secondary in importance to the need for some settlement, whatever it may be., was granted all of the rights and privileges specified in the Act of July h, 192i, as well as all of the rights and advantages stipulated in' th6 Treaty of Versailles which were to be accorded by Germany. Annex I of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1i919, set forth a detailed list of the types of recognizable cldimi' of the Allied or Associated Powers for *hidh Germany would be responsible.
VI
As an outgrowth of the above-referred-to treaties, the United States and Germany signed the Executive'Agreement bf August io, :i22, 9 *agreeing to the establishrment 6f a Mixed Claims Cofnmissioh to determine die am6unt to be paid by G&mgthy in satisfaction of Germafiy's fifiancial obligations under the Treaty of Beilin. I The first artile of that Treat . set forth the categories of claims which were tb tbe handled by the Mired' ClaimsCommisi6n irnuch more general'form thin did the Treaty of Versailles. These categbie were as follows:
(i) Claims of American citizens arising after July 31, 1914, in respect to damage to, or seizure of, their property, rights, and interests, including any company or. association in which they were interested, within Gerritan' ieiritory as ft existed 6i August I, 1914;
(2) Other claims foe loss or daimage to which the United States or its nationals had been 'subjected with respect 'td injuries'to persons, or to property rights a nd'fnieiests, ihcluitding any company or association in which'American h9tionals were interested, after July 3r, 1914, as a consequence of the war; (3) Debts owing to American' 6itizen 6j' the German GovernmenE br by German nationals. $254,274,158.89 It is interesting to note that as recently as the last session of Congress a bilP.
2 was introduced to authorize the appropriation of the sums necessary to pay the balonce of certain adjudicated but unpaid awards of the Mixed Claims Commission.
The best available information .indicates that the .principal and interest due in such cases amounts to approximately $98,Qooo....
Hearings were held on the bill, but it was not enacted into law. VII
SOURCES OF FuNDs FOR PROVIDING INDEMNIFICATION
It is possible that there are other sources of funds available foi indemnification; however, consideration here has been reserved to four: Reparation; Proceeds from Liquidated Vested Enemy Assets; Transfer of.Miscellaneous Funds; and General Legislative Appropriations. The distinctive rationale incident to the use of each of these sources indicates an individual treatment.
A. Reparation The ramifications of the problem incident to the exaction of reparation from a defeated nation are many. Although our, position has been made rather clear by a iuccession of events, meetings, pronouncements of policy, and agreements, it will not become a completely closed issue as long as the Treaties of Peace with Germany and Japan remain to be negotiated. Although there is a strong moral objection to the idea of a defeated enemy escaping obligation for the property damage, destruction, and the human suffering which it caused during a war, no one seriously suggests that we adopt a policy which is going to deprive the nationals of Germany and Japan of the means of providing for themselves. First, it is not our nature; and secondly, history has demonstrated that the exaction of heavy reparation is accompanied with adverse after effects.
The indemnity exacted by Germany from France under the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 was roughly one billion dollars. 'The year following this settlement was marked by a period of prosperity in France and depression in Germany. These facts give color to the story that Bismarck, in commenting upon the economic status of the two countries, disclosed that the next time he defeated France he would demand that Germany be permitted to pay the indemnity.
No attempt will be made here to discuss the present or future economic ability of the German or Japanese Governments to pay reparation. However, it is felt, as previously stated, that regardless of the considerations which dictate the final terms of the peace settlements, the obligation still exisfs for our Government to determine the equitable and meritorious claims arising out of the war and to insure settlements from this source in so far as possible.
The attempts to exact reparation from Germany after World War I are largely responsible for the unpleasant connotations attached to that word. Initially the United States vacillated between a policy favoring the disclaimer of reparation due under the Treaty of Versailles and its ancillary' treaties, and an occasional switch' to the policy preferred by the participating Allied Powers. Ultimately a reparation debt was created, but despite German overtures it remained always just a debt.
The sums eventually paid in reparation were much more than balanced by German net borrowing of capital and credit from the rest of the world. This condition continued until, in the midst of. a world depression, itbecame apparent that the only logical course was the complete abandonment of reparation. 'in their report on the Crimean Conference, dated February ii, x945, the Big Three for the first time issued a statement on reparation. A special section of th~e Crimea Declaration devoted to the problem provided, with respect to reparation from Germany:
We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in the war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage jn kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the allied countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.
Although the Reparation Commission was activated and accomplished its prp liminary work, appreciable progress was not made until the Potsdam Conference. T.he agreement. arising out .of ithat Conference contained an interim program of reparation from Germany. Subsequently, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France divided their reparation shares, derived from the Potsdam agreement, with fifteen other nations by the Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany, January 14, 1946. The term "reparation" within the context of such report and agreements has the meaning of compensation for damages. Further, it appears clear that whatever reparation is to be made will be made primarily in kind and not in money.
The Crimea Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement also postulated, as a basic principle of reparation policy, that distribution of German reparation assets was to be based on the extent to which an Allied Power suffered from war damage and the extent of its participation in actions leading to victory. As a result of this principle, a special share of German reparation payments was provided for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland on the one hand and the other Allied Powers on the other. Within the latter group is included the United States.
As a result of a report made by the Economic Cooperation Administration our Government and the Governments of France and the United Kingdom entered into an agreement on March 31, 1949, which provided for the removal of a limited and specified number of plants. A further agreement, known as the Petersburg Protocol, was entered into on November 22, 1949, between the High Commissioners of the three powers occupying the western zones of Germany and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic. By this Agreement, certain specified industrial plants were marked for removal. Agreement was also reached precluding further removals for reparation.
The fact that our present stated policy, as disclosed by the report of January 14, 1949, and the aforementioned agreements, precludes further reparation removals from Germany in all probability means' that reparation from Germany will be insufficient to meet war claims of United States nationals against Germany.
The Allied Powers by the Potsdam agreement further stated that the basic policy of reparation from Japan would be reparation in kind sufficient to end the Japanese war potential but not so oppressive as to disrupt the basic economy of the country. This concept of reparation was accepted by the Japanese Government under the terms of the surrender of September 2, 1945. Initially, the Far Eastern Commission, which came into being as a result of decisions reached at the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Secretaries on December 27, 1945, promulgated a series, of policy decisions concerning reparation removals of industrial property from Japan. This program failed to .make progress because of the absence of an agreement among the governments potentially entitled to a reparation share as to the percentage of reparation to be allocated. Efforts of the United States to end the impasse were unsuccessful.
In a statemeat' 3 outlining the positiqn of the United States concerning the future exaction of reparation. from Japan, General. It is the considered view of the United States Government that this objective does not require that Japan's production for peaceful purposes be limited or that limitations be imposed on levels of 'Japanese productive capacity in industries devoted to peaceful purposes. This belief, coupled with the evidence of Japan's present economic plight and the difficult problems Japan will face, in the future in attaining levels of industrial production and foreign trade sufficient to support its people even at minimum levels, render it clearly advisable in-my Government's vieiw that Japan be permitted to develop its peaceful industries without limitation. The problem facing us is not one of limitation of Japan's peacefil' industries but of reviving these industries to provide the people's barest wants.
The effect of this pronouncement was the rescission by the United States of an earlier interim directive on reparation removal and, in effect, the termination of the entire program for the removal of reparation from Japan.
The. Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany, which became effective Jnuary 14, 1946, was participated in by he United States and 17 other nations., It provided for the percentage participation of the Allied Powers in German assets subject to reparation.
The United States, under theterms of the Paris Agreement, is to receive stated .percentages of. all German assets subject. to reparation payments. In addition, the United States of America .is to retain control over German assets within, its jurisdiction which are now subject to the control of the Office of Alien Property, Department of .Justice.
The Paris Agreement fuither stipulated that the signatory governments agree among themselves that their respective reparation shares are regarded by them as covering all of. their claims and -the claims Pf their. nationals against the former .German Government and its agencies,, which claims -arose out of the war and pre not otherwise~provided for.
It is worth noting that although the reparation shares assigned by the Paris Agree-.ment are based, in part, on a consideration of private losses resulting from war damage to property, the allocation of reparation is made, not to the individuals, but ,to the several governments involved. The compensation of private persons who hold claims against Germany arising out of the war is a matter for the Allied Governments to handle in accordance with their respective governmental procedures.
i. Peace Treaties Negotiated to 'Date'
A general peace conference of the tWenty-one nations which participated in the War agaiiist Germany, met in: Pars on Jury' 29, 1946, to consider the terms of P e Treaties with Italy, Hun'gary, Rimania, ahd Bulgaria. This conference had iis 'origin in'the Potsdam Conference. "
In discussing the stipulations concerning the iecognition and settlement of war "claims' contained in'the peac tra6tS negdtiated 'to date my comments will be extremely general. in nature. No attempt is rhiid.e herein to outline all of the pertinent clauses of each of the treaties.
a. Italy. The Treaty of Peace with Italy
14 provides for the restitution of property to the United States' 5 and for the indemnification of the United States or its nationals for loss or damage to property in Italy, territories ceded by Italy, and the Free Territory of Trieste' 6 Those eligible for restoration of property and for indemnification for damage to, or loss of, property include individuals who were American nationals, corporations, or associations organized under the laws of the United States at the time the Treaty came into force, provided that such individuals, corporations, or associations were also American nationals on September 3, 1943, the date of the armistice with Italy. Individuals, corporations, or associations which were treated as enemy under the laws in force in Italy during the war are also eligible clainants. In the event that disputes arise under the ldauses relating to indniificatioid-and restitution, the final decision is to be made by a conciliation commission.
On August 14, 1947, a "Memorandum of understanding regarding settlement of certain wartime claims and related mattfrs" and a "Memorandum of understaiding regarding Italian assets in the United States of America and certain claims'of United States nationals" were sigfied in Washington by-Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State, on behalf of the United State, and Ivan Matteo Lombardo, Chief of the Italian Economic and Financial Delegadon, on behalf' of Italy. . These memoranda and certain supplementary notes, ordinarily referred. to as the "Lombardo Agreement," generally reaffirmed provisions of the Peace Treaty, and provided specific detail as to the interpretation of some of the broad terms contained therein. Both nations agreed to 'waive certain' enumerated claims which might -arise under the -Treaty.
t : Provision was .als6 made, under certain conditions, for the'return of vested proparty and the unblocking of frozen Italian asets. In return, 'the Italian Government agreed to place at the disposal of -our Government-the sum 'of $5,ooo,ooo to be used in meeting war claims of United States nationals 'for which there was no other provision in the Treaty of Peace or in the: agtement.: i The Italian-American Conciliation Commission: was created atcording to Article 83 of the Treaty of Peace..with, Italy; .APny .disputes involving the United States or its nationals which may arise under Articles 75 or 78 of the Treaty, or 'inder certaifn specified annexes, will be referred to. .tis Commission which consists of one representative from-each of the two Governments. If -within three "mbnth § aftei. 'the 9 and for the indemnification of American nationals who suffered loss or damage to their property in territories of such former enemy governmentso Individuals who are American nationals, or corporations or associations organized under the laws of the United States, and who were nationals at the time the Treaties of Peace came into force are eligible for indemnification, provided that such individuals, corporations, or associations were also American nationals on the respective dates of the armistices with the former enemy governments. 2 ' Individuals, corporations, or associations which were treated as enemy under the laws in force in the territories of the former enemy governments during the war are also eligible claimanS22 ants.2
In the Treaties with the Governments of Bulgaria and Hungary, the property subject to indemnification is defined as all movable or immovable property, whether tangible or intangible, including industrial, literary, and artistic property. Also included are rights or interests of any kind in property.2 3 In the Treaty with the Government of Rumania, in addition to the above property, there are also included certain seagoing and river vessels and the equipment thereon.
The general policy of the indemnification and restoration provisions of the Treaties of Peace with these former enemy governments is to provide for the restoration or return of the property, legal rights, and interests of the United States of America and its nationals. In the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria the date for determining the nature, extent, and status of the rights of the Government of the United States of America and its nationals is April 24, I94r.24 In the Treaties of Peace with Hungary and Rumania, the controlling date is September x, i939.28
In the event that disputes arise under the clauses relating to indemnification and restitution, the. decision is to be made by a conciliation commission consisting of an equal number of representatives of the Government of the United States of America and of the former enemy government. Procedures are also established for the selection of a third member of the Conciliation Commission if agreement cannot be reached "'Bulgaria (6x STAT. 1915 "' B Art. 3V; H Art. 35; R Art. 32.
Prospective Treaties with
Germany, Japan, and Austria a. Germany. Although the Treaties of Peace already negotiated may be looked to for guidance in any estimate of the probable nature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, further special factors inherent in Germany's wartime and post-war position necessitate certain differences. Germany was the piiincipal European aggressor, and, consequently, she is responsible for the greater portion of the claims which have arisen as a result of World War II.
The preceding discussion of the general policy of the United States regarding reparation and the specific provisions of the Paris Agreement indicate rather dearly what to expect in the way of claims settlements out of reparation derived from a Treaty of Peace with Germany. However, one of the major obstacles to any evaluation of the probable terms of a Treaty of Peace with Germany lies in the interpretation of the waiver stipulated by the Paris Agreement. If the waiver is deemed to be restrictive, our present policy on reparation in essence forecloses any possibility that the Treaty of Peace with Germany will provide effective compensation for war claims.
The extent to which this waiver is operative is in doubt in view of the fact that it is qualified so as to be without prejudice to a later determination of the forms, duration, and total amount of reparation to be made by Germany and the rights which a signatory government may have to the final settlement of German reparation.
b. Japan. If any substantial satisfaction of war claims against Japan is to be effected, it would appear that an essential element of any peace settlement with Japan, in so far as it relates to war claims, would be a provision setting forth the procedures necessary for the creation of a fund from which such war claims can be satisfied. This is especially important in view of the extent and nature of the personal injury claims for which Japan is liable. In addition, indemnification and restoration provisions similar to those obtaining in the existing peace treaties will also be necessary.
c. Austria. In as much as Austria was not an independent nation during World War II and was not at war with the United States, war claims arising in Austria are attributable to the activities of the former German Government. In the Foreign Ministers' declaration on Austria made at Moscow on November 1, 1943, it was stated that the annexation by Germany of Austria on March 15, 1938, was null and void, and that the intention of the Allied Powers was the reestablishment of Austria as a free and independent nation. This net equity is deemed to* be subject to a probable payment of'debt and tite claims of between $35,00o,o00 ahd $5oooo,oo. Pending cas~s in the process of litigation, under section 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, amount to $125,oooooo. On the basis of these figures, it appears that between $i69,9oo,ooo and $184,900,000 will eventually be available for transfer to the, War
Claims Fund. However, it is believed that 'thes& estimateg are low' in the light of two factors. First, it is extremely doubtful that all of the pending litigation under section 9(a) ivill result' in the retuin' of vested property. Therefore, 'in all probability,' at least a portion of the aforementioned, $i2 5 ,o'oo,boo will eventually be available for transfer to the War Claims Fund. In addition, the Office of Alien Property is presently vesting 'additional assets' at the rate of: approximately $25,ooo,ooo per year. Undoubtedly, a portion of the newly vested assets will also eventually be available for transfer to the War Claims Fund.
By the passage of the War'Claims Act of 1948, Congress, in addition to authorizing a study of war claims, provided for the payment of claims (a) for detentiin; disability, and death by' c"rtairi civilian internees whc' were interned or in hiding in ipecffied Pacific areas; "(b) for compensation by prisoners of war who did not recehe adequate rations in accordance with "the terms 6f the Geneva 'Convention of Jtily i7, 1929; (c) for' reimbursement'by certain religious organizations functioning l the' Philippines, for services "and supplies' furnished to United States forces or United States 'citizens; and (d) foi reimbursement or cancellation of repatriation expenses paid or owing by certain persons to the Department of State.
It is estimated that the cost of settling these claims will approximate $i5o,6oo,ooo. Tfierefore, on the baisis' of current figures, it 'app:ears that 6om $20,000,000 to 2862 SrAr. 1246 SrAr. , 1247 , 50 U. S. C. App. § §2oxIx, 2ox2 (Supp. ig5o). CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR WAR Loss $25,000,000 will eventually be available for the satisfaction of additional war claims. It is possible that, by further vesting and by successful defense of section 9(a) litigation cases, there may be available a sum in excess of $5o,ooo,ooo for this purpose.
C. Transfer of Miscellaneous Funds
During the war and since the termination of hostilities, numerous miscellaneous accounts have been set up in the Department of the Treasury. Although in many instances these accounts have been merged with the general funds of the Treasury, they are of interest in exploring the possibilities for the settlement of war claims. . The accounts indicated do not reflect the previously referred to proceeds of the Office of Alien Property, nor is this list intended to include all of the account of this type. They are merely examples of the miscellaneous funds in question.
In yiew pf the. fact that all of the amounts listed . represent income from either wartime governmental activities or proceeds from reparation from enemy countries, it would seem that consideration might justifiably be..given to their use for the satisfaction of war claims. Up to date information concerning the status and aInount of these fund's is difficult to obtain. 
D. General Legislative Appropriations
As indicated earlier Congress has already by some. fifty Congressional enactments appropriated, in some measure, to distribute the burden of war losses. In breaking down this legislation into categories, reference-is made to War Insurance Legislation; Military and Naval Claims Legislation;. Rehabilitation, .Indemification and Relief Legislation; and War Contracts Legislation. Although all of these types represent Congressional distribution of war loss, it -is believed-that specific enactments falling under the headings Military and Naval Claims Legislation and Rehabilitation, Indemnification and Relief Legislation, are most representative.
i. Military and Naval Claims Legislation
The Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945,80 as amended, authorized the Department of the Army to compensate its civilian employees and military personnel for certain damage to or loss, destruction, capture, or abandonment of personal property incident to their service. The Philippine War Damage Commission was authorized to adjudicate and pay up to a maximum of 75 per cent of the determined allowable amount for damage to certain types of tangible property. The remaining 25 per cent was to be paid by means of reparation or indemnity received by the United States from Japan on account of war losses in the Philippines, after the United States had reimbursed itself for funds appropriated under the Act.
Provision was also made for the construction and repair of certain public works such as highways and port facilities and the establishment of survey and training projects in the fields of public health, sea and air navigation, weather facilities, and coast and geodetic surveys.
VIII
CONCLUSIONS
It has often been suggested that provision for the payment of war claims, at least those in the high-priority groups, be made by direct appropriation from the general funds of the Treasury, without regard to possible reparation payments or the proceeds of liquidated enemy assets. It has been urged that such an approach would assure that any moral obligation of the Government to insure compensation of its nationals for war damage would not be dependent upon the uncertainties of future financial settlements with enemy countries or ultimate realization on vested enemy property.
Certainly it is idle to contemplate that more than a fraction of the costs of World War II and the claims arising out of it can be settled from enemy property now held or from indemnities later recovered. However, it is believed that before complete reliance for the settlement of war claims is placed upon direct Congressional appropriation, a vigorous attempt must be made to settle the maximum number of claims from the two sources indicated.
In considering the question of national policy as to enemy assets which have been blocked or vested, cognizance must be taken of the many bills which are pending in Congress which, if enacted, would dissipate the amount potentially available from this source for the settlement of war claims.
With the passage of time there is a growing pressure to again adopt the "soft" attitude which we fostered toward Germany shortly after World War I and to ignore and write off the war claims of American nationals. It is hoped that Congress will adopt a cautious attitude in this regard and that, before acting on the many pending bills which would amend the Trading With the Enemy Act, it will reacquaint itself with the uncompensated personal suffering and economic injury which resulted from the war.
Reparation as a source of settlement, as already indicated, is certainly not a closed issue. Before it becomes a closed issue, however, we should learn the complete story regarding the types, volume, and value of war claims. It is doubtful that in
